There was a time when many campus AV systems could live outside the main security conversation. They were isolated, purpose-built, and often disconnected from broader institutional risk discussions. That time is over.
Today’s AV systems are increasingly made up of network-connected endpoints: displays, control processors, DSPs, cameras, encoders, decoders, collaboration appliances, lecture capture systems, streaming platforms, and management tools. As AV-over-IP, cloud services, and remote administration become more common, the line between AV and IT continues to blur. Industry sources across AV and integration media now consistently describe this convergence as one of the defining realities of modern system design.
Yet many campuses still treat AV security as secondary. That is a mistake, especially in higher education. Colleges and universities operate in environments that are highly decentralized, resource-constrained, and filled with diverse technologies spread across classrooms, event spaces, meeting rooms, student centers, and specialty environments. The same openness that makes a campus function can also make it harder to maintain consistent standards. If AV systems are connected to the institutional network, they are part of the institution’s attack surface. That is true whether the device is a sophisticated AVoIP endpoint or a small controller tucked behind a display.
The most important shift campus leaders need to make is conceptual: AV systems are no longer just presentation tools. They are managed network devices. Once that is understood, the security conversation becomes much more practical.
It starts with basic hygiene. Default passwords should not survive deployment. Unused services should be disabled. Firmware cannot be ignored after install. Remote access must be deliberate and controlled. Network segmentation should be standard practice, not a special request. Commercial Integrator’s recent cybersecurity coverage has emphasized secure deployment steps such as encryption, MFA where supported, and designing communications with security in mind from the point of installation rather than after the fact.
None of this is glamorous, and that is exactly the point. Most security failures in operational technology environments do not begin with cinematic hacking. They begin with overlooked basics: undocumented devices, stale credentials, unsupported firmware, excessive access, and systems that were purchased for features without meaningful review of their security posture.
Higher education is particularly vulnerable to this pattern because budgets often prioritize installation over lifecycle support. A room refresh gets funded. A new building gets funded. A platform rollout gets funded. Long-term patch management, asset inventory discipline, and end-of-life replacement planning are often less visible and less exciting. That gap creates real risk. Commentary in the AV industry has increasingly tied inventory discipline and technical debt directly to both obsolescence and security exposure.
This is why AV security cannot be reduced to a compliance checkbox. It has to be part of design, procurement, and operations.
At the design stage, institutions should ask whether a proposed system aligns with how the campus manages networks and identities. Can the devices be segmented appropriately? What ports and protocols are required? Is encryption supported? Are management interfaces secured? Is there logging? Can unnecessary features be disabled? A secure AV system is not one that claims to be secure in a brochure; it is one that can fit into the institution’s actual governance model.
At the procurement stage, higher education buyers should be pressing manufacturers harder. Secure-by-design should mean more than a vague promise. It should include secure defaults, documented hardening guidance, transparent firmware practices, role-based administration, support for modern certificate and credential practices where appropriate, and a credible process for vulnerability disclosure and remediation. As AV products become more software-defined and more dependent on network services, these expectations should be normal, not aspirational. Broader industry discussion about open ecosystems, APIs, cloud-native management, and remote analytics only makes that expectation more urgent.
At the operational stage, the conversation becomes even more important. Who owns the patch cycle? Who tracks inventory? Who reviews end-of-support dates? Who determines whether a remote access method is acceptable? Who responds if a classroom device starts behaving abnormally on the network? In too many organizations, those answers are fuzzy. In security, fuzzy ownership is where trouble starts.
This is why AV and IT collaboration matters so much. The goal is not for AV teams to become security engineers overnight, nor for IT teams to become AV designers. The goal is shared responsibility with clear boundaries. AV teams understand workflows, user needs, room behavior, and operational dependencies. IT teams understand segmentation, identity, monitoring, policy, and risk management. Secure systems emerge when those perspectives are combined early enough to influence design rather than late enough to create friction.
Higher education should also be careful not to frame security as the enemy of usability. A classroom that is theoretically secure but impossible for faculty to use is still a failed design. The challenge is to build systems that are both manageable and teachable, both protected and practical. That balance is not always easy, but it is achievable when security is treated as a design requirement rather than a restriction added after deployment.
The AV industry has spent years talking about convergence. In higher education, that convergence is no longer a future trend. It is the present operating environment. If AV runs on the network, it must be designed, purchased, and supported with the same seriousness as any other institutional technology service.
For colleges and universities, the real question is no longer whether AV belongs in the security conversation. It is why any campus would still leave it out.
